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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, citing state constitutional grounds, the California Supreme
Court invalidated the California Defense of Marriage Act, eight years after
California voters first ratified a change to California’s Family Code
defining marriage as being between a man and a woman only.1 Moving
quickly, opponents of same-sex marriage renewed their efforts and
successfully ratified Proposition 8, an initiative that amended the California
∗
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most importantly, to all the staff of the Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law.
1. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (relying on the
privacy, due process, and equal protection guarantee clauses of the California
Constitution to declare California Family Code § 308.5 unconstitutional).
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Constitution with the same definition.2 In 2009, the California Supreme
Court upheld the new ban.3 Opponents of Proposition 8 mounted a federal
constitutional challenge, and, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, U.S. District
Chief Judge Vaughn Walker held that Proposition 8 violated the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution.4
The official proponents5 of Proposition 8 under California election law
have appealed on the merits, but the dispute may turn on a startling
technicality.6 The Ninth Circuit must confront the question of whether the
official proponents have standing to defend the constitutionality of their
initiative on appeal, when the state defendants have declined to do so.7
Part II.A of this Note explains that the proponents must have standing in
order to appeal on their own.8 Part II.B briefly summarizes the relevant
case law on standing.9 Part III examines two questions: whether
proponents have special status under California law as the official sponsors
of the initiative and whether they might assert general voter standing.10
Part IV concludes that the proponents should be allowed to assert voter
standing due to the case’s exceptional circumstances.11
2. Proposition 8 became law in 2008. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, invalidated by
Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009).
3. See Strauss, 207 P.3d at 122 (concluding Proposition 8 did not violate the
limitations on initiative power, because it was a constitutional amendment and not a
constitutional revision).
4. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994-95, 997-1004 (N.D. Cal.
2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (concluding that
Proposition 8 can advance no rational basis for discriminating between hetero- and
homosexual couples nor meet strict scrutiny review for impairing the fundamental right
of marriage).
5. Id. at 928 (identifying “Protectmarriage.com – Yes on 8, a Project of California
Renewal” as the official proponents of Proposition 8).
6. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinksy, Who Has Standing to Appeal Prop. 8 Ruling?,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010 (arguing that conservative standing rules will prevent the
proponents from having standing to appeal).
7. See Defendant-Intervenors’-Appellants’ Emergency Mot. for Stay Pending
Appeal at 19-23, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292
VRW) [hereinafter Proponents’ Motion] (arguing that the proponents have either
personal standing or standing to represent state interests); Pl.’s & Plaintiff-Intervenor’s
Joint Opp. to Defendant-Intervenors’ Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal at 3-4, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW) [hereinafter Joint Opp.
to Defendant-Intervenors’ Mot. for Stay] (arguing that the proponents cannot show a
constitutionally cognizable harm).
8. See infra Part II.A (concluding that Supreme Court precedent requires
interveners who appeal, without other parties, to meet standing requirements).
9. See infra Part II.B (explaining that courts have supplemented constitutional
standing requirements with prudential rules).
10. See infra Part III (rejecting proponents’ arguments and arguing for voter
standing instead).
11. See infra Part IV (concluding that relaxing prudential standing requirements in
the exceptional circumstances of Perry vindicates voting rights).
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II. BACKGROUND
Standing encompasses a set of both constitutional and judge-made
(“prudential”) rules that ensure courts only entertain those controversies
that they have the judicial power to remedy.12 This background explains,
first, why the proponent interveners in Perry must assert standing and then,
second, which requirements they must meet in order to prevail.13
A. Interveners Who Pursue an Appeal Alone
The Supreme Court has not clearly announced whether standing is
always necessary to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.14
The Supreme Court has, however, required standing for intervenerappellants when there is no other party with standing joining them on
appeal.15 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle recently in a case
explicitly concerned with ballot initiative proponents.16
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, the Supreme Court
questioned whether the sponsors of an Arizona ballot initiative, which
created a law requiring English to be the official language of Arizona, had
standing to appeal alone.17 In dicta, the Court offered three reasons why
the sponsors should not have standing: the sponsors were not elected, there
was no state law authorizing their suit, and the Court had never identified
the proponents as the proper defenders of their initiatives.18 Because the
Court resolved Arizonans on mootness grounds,19 the Court vacated the
12. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583 (1992) (explaining
that the purpose of standing is to limit the role of courts in a democratic society to
deciding those cases involving parties with concrete, adverse interests, instead of
resolving hypothetical injuries).
13. See infra Parts II.A and II.B.
14. See, e.g., Kerry C. White, Note, Rule 24(A) Intervention of Right: Why the
Federal Courts Should Require Standing to Intervene, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 527, 544,
551-52, 558-59 (2002) (arguing that if interveners require standing to appeal, they
should also need standing to intervene, because interveners may otherwise be stuck
with an adverse ruling should the parties with standing opt not to appeal).
15. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 58 (1986) (requiring a doctor who had
intervened at the district level to show standing on appeal when no other parties on his
side had also appealed).
16. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64-66 (1997)
(questioning quasi-legislative standing of initiative proponents but deciding the case on
mootness grounds).
17. See id. at 55-57, 65-66 (questioning the Ninth Circuit’s theory that a sponsor of
a ballot initiative has the same standing to defend the constitutionality of a state statute
as an actual legislature does).
18. See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81-82 (1987) (upholding the standing of the
Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly and the President of the New Jersey
Senate, because the New Jersey Supreme Court had granted their applications to
intervene on behalf of the legislature).
19. See 520 U.S. at 67-68 (where a state employee, who alleged a law
unconstitutionally prohibited her from speaking Spanish in the course of her duties, left
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Ninth Circuit’s decision to grant standing to initiative proponents under a
“quasi-legislative” theory and never formally overruled it.20 Arizonans, at
least, stands for the principle that under current Supreme Court precedent,
appellant-intervenors, including ballot initiative proponents, must have
standing in order to independently argue an appeal.21
B. Basic Standing Requirements
Article III of the United States Constitution authorizes federal courts to
entertain only actual cases or controversies.22 In addition to constitutional
limits on standing, courts have imposed judicially crafted “prudential
standing” limitations to deny standing when an injury is generalized among
a population and not specific to an individual or a “distinct group.”23
To show Article III standing, a party must assert injury in fact, causation,
and redressability.24 Injury in fact means that there has been an invasion of
a “legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized,” while
causation means that it is possible to trace the injury to the challenged
action of the defendant.25 Finally, redressability means that a court must be
capable of taking some action to address the complained of injury.26
The Court has recognized circumstances in which prudential standing
requirements do not bar a suit. In FEC v. Atkins, for example, the Supreme
Court found injury in fact where voters sought to compel the Federal
Election Commission to enforce disclosures regarding membership,
contributions, and expenditures by a political organization that arguably
the state’s employment, the controversy became moot); see also id. at 74-75 (vacating
the lower court’s decision because it would be inequitable to allow a party to obtain a
favorable result in a lower court and then act to moot the controversy before the case
could be evaluated on appeal).
20. The quasi-legislative standing theory is beyond the scope of this Note. See
generally Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731-33 (9th Cir. 1991) (granting the
official sponsors of an initiative quasi-legislative standing, because their efforts in
obtaining the initiative’s successful passage would be “essentially nullified” by
allowing a ruling below to stand without appeal).
21. See also Order Granting Stay at 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th
Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (requiring parties to brief the issue of proponents’ standing).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 102 (1998) (noting that standing rules keep courts focused on issues that are
resolvable through the judicial process).
23. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 747 F.2d 99, 107-08 (1984) (denying
standing when the Sierra Club could not show injury to itself or members living near an
alleged polluter).
24. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102-03; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992).
25. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 41-42 (1976)).
26. See id. at 568 (explaining that the plaintiffs failed to show redressability when a
ruling would not bind non-party agencies whose regulations the plaintiffs sought to
alter).
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fell under a statutory reporting requirement.27 The Court found that the
voters had standing, even though the grievance was widely shared, because
the Federal Election Campaign Act authorized voter lawsuits and because
Congress could relax prudential standing requirements through statute.28 In
this case, the Court also accorded voter standing a higher status than
standing in other contexts.29
III. ARGUMENT
Contrary to the contentions of proponents of Proposition 8, California
state law does not “authorize” proponent standing.30 There should be a
reevaluation of the issue of voter standing when state officials fail to
defend a popular initiative in federal court.31
A. State Law Does Not Authorize Proponent Standing
The proponents rely on Karcher v. May and a pair of California cases to
argue that California law authorizes them to defend the constitutionality of
Proposition 8.32 This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First,
California has peculiar state standing rules that are distinct from federal
standards.33 Second, proponents cite cases that either reflect such local
practice or are factually distinct.34
In Karcher, the Supreme Court focused on the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s willingness to grant the “application” of the leaders of the New
Jersey legislature to assert standing on the legislature’s behalf.35 However,
27. See FEC v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 20-21 (1998) (noting that prudential standing
requirements are satisfied when an injury is within the “zone of interests” provided for
by a statute).
28. Id. at 19 (pointing to specific legislative language in the FECA allowing
parties to file a complaint with the Commission and to dispute the result in federal
court).
29. Compare United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-80 (1974) (holding
that a taxpayer alleging a Constitutional requirement for the CIA to report its
expenditures had too generalized a grievance to obtain standing), with Atkins, 524 U.S.
at 22 (distinguishing Richardson, in part, as being concerned with taxpayer, and not
voter, standing).
30. See infra Part II.A.
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See Proponents’ Motion, supra note 7, at 19.
33. See Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 16-18 (Ct. App. 2001)
(explaining that the California Constitution does not have a “case or controversy”
limitation and does not impose federal standing standards).
34. The cases proponents cite in footnote 8 of their brief involve factually distinct
pre- or postelection reviews or have additional parties with standing on both sides. See,
e.g., Independent Energy Prod. Ass’n v. McPherson, 136 P.3d 178, 179-81, 184-85
(Cal. 2006) (allowing initiative sponsors to defend postelection challenge to
constitutionality of a defeated initiative).
35. See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 81-82 (1987) (pointing out that when a new
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in contrast to proponents’ interpretation, the issue was not whether the New
Jersey Supreme Court had granted the leaders special standing under
federal law but whether it had granted them standing to represent the
legislature, since U.S. Supreme Court precedent already allowed legislative
standing.36 The proponents of Proposition 8 exaggerate Karcher; state
courts cannot simply grant anyone standing, as a matter of state law, to sue
in federal courts.37 Even if they could, in considering Proposition 8, the
California Supreme Court never granted proponents such special standing,
nor authorized them to represent the legislature or initiative voters.38
Connerly v. State Personnel Board and Costa v. Superior Court—the
primary cases that the proponents cite in their brief—offer little support for
the theory that state law specifically authorizes initiative-proponent
standing.39 Costa concerned a preelection procedural challenge to the
manner by which the proponents therein had prepared their ballot for a
vote.40 Since California election law tasks proponents in general with
following certain procedures to bring a proposed initiative to vote, such
proponents naturally have standing to make and answer procedural
challenges.41
Proponents of Proposition 8 also misconstrue Connerly as expounding
the point that initiative proponents have a direct interest in their initiative,
once it has become law, above and beyond the general public.42 The
language on which proponents rely comes from an earlier case asserting
that initiative proponents have a “direct interest . . . over and above the
interest held in common with the public.”43 However, in that case, the
dispute was also procedural and took place before any vote: those
election ousted the majority leaders from majority leadership positions, they could no
longer represent the legislature).
36. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997) (granting standing to
legislators where their votes had been “nullified”).
37. See id. at 820 (noting that even Congress cannot abolish the requirements of
injury, causation, and redressability).
38. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 69 & n. 5 (Cal. 2009) (noting without
analysis that the court had granted proponents’ application for intervention).
39. Cf. Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 432 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009) (noting that California courts do not follow federal standing principles
and have more lax requirements).
40. Cf. Costa v. Superior Court, 128 P.3d 675, 684-85, 693 (Cal. 2006)
(distinguishing a procedural challenge from a challenge to a statute’s substantive
validity).
41. Compare CAL. ELEC. CODE § 10 (Deering 2010) (calling the Secretary of State
the “chief elections officer”), with § 342 (defining proponents in narrow, procedural
terms).
42. See Proponents’ Motion, supra note 7, at 21-22 (citing Connerly v. State
Personnel Bd., 129 P.3d 1, 6-7 (Cal. 2006)).
43. Connerly, 129 P.3d at 7-8 (quoting Sonoma Cnty. Nuclear Free Zone ‘86 v.
Superior Court, 234 Cal. Rptr. 357, 362 (1987)).
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proponents were asserting that opponents to their proposed initiative could
not file a ballot argument past a certain deadline.44 Proponents simply
cannot rely on California cases granting standing to initiative proponents in
procedural disputes to argue that such cases grant a postelection stake in a
successful initiative.45
Ultimately, the California Constitution states that the people of
California—not initiative proponents—directly possess the initiative
power.46 Only “the state, through its elected representatives[,] . . .
possess[es] the exclusive power, to abandon or change the statutory
scheme.”47 Initiative proponents lack this power; they cannot change or
abandon an adopted initiative unilaterally; rather, they must lobby the
legislature or seek a new initiative to change the law.48 If the people of
California want state law to authorize initiative proponents to litigate the
constitutionality of future propositions in federal court, they have a possible
solution: they could attempt to exercise the initiative power to create such
authorization.49
B. The Proponents Should be Permitted to Assert Voter Standing Because
the Exceptional Failure of the California Officials to Defend Initiative
Interests Arguably Violates California Law and Requires Special Remedial
Measures
In their opposition to the proponents’ stay motion, the respondents argue
that no special injury distinguishes the proponents from the California
voting public.50 While it is true that the courts have prevented parties from
asserting standing based upon a generalized grievance, this is not a
constitutional requirement.51 In fact, the Supreme Court has explicitly
distinguished abstract injuries, where there is no injury in fact, from
44. See Sonoma Cnty., 234 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (holding that courts cannot exercise
discretion and review argument deadlines).
45. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9000-96 (prescribing the procedural role of
proponents in bringing an initiative to ballot).
46. See CAL. CONST art. IV, § 1 (stating that “the people reserve to themselves the
powers of initiative and referendum”).
47. See Connerly, 129 P.3d at 10 (holding that when an amicus curiae stepped in to
defend challenged statutes and state agencies declined to do so, the agencies had to pay
any awarded plaintiff’s fees).
48. See Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Camarillo, 718 P.2d 68, 74 (Cal. 1986)
(noting that the people’s initiative power is coextensive with the power of the
legislature).
49. Whether this could pass constitutional muster is beyond the scope of this Note.
Cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 n.17 (1986) (stating that the Illinois legislature
“has the power to create new interests, the invasion of which may confer standing”).
50. Joint Opp. to Defendant-Intervenors’ Mot. for Stay, supra note 7, at 4.
51. See Gladstone v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (holding that
Congress can abrogate prudential standing limits).
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generalized injuries.52
Nevertheless, prudential concerns arise in Perry, because, unlike the
voters in Atkins, the California proponents lack any statutory authorization
to assert a generalized grievance.53 In Atkins, a congressional grant
overcame the prudential standing bar.54 Proponents cannot point to a
similarly favorable grant under California law.55 Proponents might argue
that the constitutional language granting initiative voting rights shows
California’s desire to “cast the standing net broadly,”56 but the California
Constitution does not actually “grant” anything. Instead, it reserves to the
people a legislative power, not a judicial one.57
A better argument is that, in an exceptional case such as this, the policy
rationales for prudential standing do not apply.58 A plurality of the
Supreme Court once suggested in the third-party standing context that
courts can temper prudential standing requirements when the underlying
policy rationales for them are absent.59 The plurality studied (1) whether
the lawsuit would actually affect the enjoyment of a right of an absent party
and (2) whether there was a genuine obstacle preventing the absent party,
from asserting the right herself.60 Although Perry is not a third-party
standing case, it is analogously impractical for California’s voters to assert
their voting rights, such as through a new initiative because the lawsuit will
be over too soon for one to take effect.61 Second, any decision for or
against proponents would be binding on the people of California, because
52. See, e.g., FEC v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998) (noting that widely shared
injuries are not always abstract injuries).
53. See id. at 19 (discussing how the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
allows individuals who suspect a violation of the act to file a complaint with the FEC
and to file a petition in federal district court if they are “aggrieved” by an FEC
dismissal of their complaint).
54. See id. (noting that use of the language “aggrieved” indicates congressional
intent to cast the standing net widely).
55. Cf. Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2006) (requiring an entity to
have an interest “different in substance” from like-minded members of the general
public to be a real party in interest for purposes of attorney fee liability).
56. Cf. Atkins, 524 U.S. at 19.
57. See Martin v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307, 309 (Ct. App. 1959) (noting that the
referendum is a reserved power of the people, not a granted power).
58. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-16 (1976) (plurality decision)
(arguing that when a third party has a close relationship with an absent litigant and the
absent litigant faces a genuine obstacle to asserting her own interests, courts should
allow standing).
59. See id. (focusing on the relationship between the third party and the one
asserting the third party’s rights, as well as the ability of the third party to assert rights
directly).
60. See id. at 115-16; see also id. at 116 (Powell, J., concurring) (rejecting a
“genuine obstacle” test and adopting an “in all terms impractical” test instead).
61. Cf. Order Granting Stay at 1-2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th
Cir. Aug. 16, 2010) (expediting the appeal).
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the constitutionality of a statute affects everyone who voted for it; in fact,
not allowing an appeal would bind voters anyway.62 Thus, by analogy, the
rationales for prudential standing are muted in this case.
Asking California voters to rely on their representatives to assert their
rights does not effectively protect their voting rights, either, because
California law only ambiguously imposes an obligation on the executive
branch to defend state statutes.63 There is a real possibility that the
incumbent state government can collude with a plaintiff to get a case into
court, lose by default, and thereby nullify a popular vote.64
The proponents’ case is distantly reminiscent of Baker v. Carr, in which
the Court noted that voters could challenge state actions that
unconstitutionally deprive citizens of a voting right.65 As Justice Clark
noted in his concurrence, without standing, the voters of Tennessee had no
way to obtain vindication at the polls for a districting scheme that favored
rural areas over urban areas.66 Similarly, the people of California can only
belatedly punish the choice of their state representatives to acquiesce; if the
district court decision stands, there is nothing the people of California can
do.67 This situation conflicts with the importance that California courts
have placed upon the initiative power.68
IV. CONCLUSION
California law has high regard for the initiative power and likely does not
contemplate the disenfranchisement of initiative proponents when the State
has declined to defend a statute enacted by initiative. This Note has argued
that the exceptional circumstance of named state defendants ignoring their
(arguable) duties under a state constitution requires courts to vindicate the
people’s interests through relaxed prudential requirements for voter
62. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 135 (1986) (pointing out that a lower
court’s determination of a state’s statute as unconstitutional is binding when parties
acquiesce below).
63. See Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 129 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Cal. 2006) (refusing to
decide whether state agencies must defend state laws in court).
64. See, e.g., Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1991) (pointing out
that the people use the initiative precisely because they do not believe the normal
process of government will be “sensitive to popular will with respect to a particular
subject”).
65. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) (explaining that the
Constitution protects citizens from state action impairing their vote).
66. See id. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring) (arguing that the people of Tennessee
had no “practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at the polls”).
67. Cf. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 7 (imposing a duty on the state Attorney General to
enforce the California laws).
68. See Martin v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 307, 309 (Ct. App. 1959) (“[I]t is the duty of
the courts to jealously guard this right of the people and to prevent any action which
would improperly annul that right.”).
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standing. Nor does it make sense to console voters by pointing to their
representatives; the people of California used the initiative in the first place
because the normal representative process had failed them. Political voting
will not always vindicate such rights. It is a quintessential function of the
courts to “jealously guard” the people’s rights, and, were it not for the
exceptional acquiescence of the California executives, this would be
exactly the kind of case or controversy courts routinely resolve.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss1/24

10

